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volume 75, issue 1, jan 2023
1. title: foreign aid and political support: how politicians' aid oversight capacity and voter information condition credit-giving
authors: baldwin, kate; winters, matthew s.
abstract: prominent scholarship on foreign aid argues that aid can interfere with citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable. one particular concern is that politicians receive undeserved credit for aid projects due to misattribution by voters with low information. but in some cases, politicians exert effort to ensure the success of projects and thus may deserve any credit they receive from voters. the authors show that the credit politicians receive depends both on voter information and on the capacity of politicians' offices to provide oversight. drawing on original surveys of politicians and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) in uganda, the authors describe circumstances in which politicians support the realization and administration of aid projects. the authors then use an experiment to show that information about foreign financing and ngo implementation of these projects reduces support for incumbent politicians only when their offices have low aid oversight capacity. the authors also provide evidence from other african countries that shows that credit-giving for aid depends on both information and state capacity. their results suggest that voters think realistically about what politicians might have contributed to aid projects and update their assessments accordingly.
2. title: local partisan biases in allocations of foreign aid: a study of agricultural assistance in india
authors: min, brian; arima, eugenio; backer, david; hicken, allen; ken kollman*; et al.
abstract: in principle, aid from donor organizations to developing countries should be based on need and the likelihood of positive impact, but political biases may intrude into decisions about aid allocations. this article elaborates a theory about why a particular form of bias, one based on partisan affiliations, can affect where aid goes and whether the goals of aid are met. party networks can facilitate coordination of decisions and leverage bureaucratic capacity, but they can also ensure that resources, such as aid, stay in the control of copartisans to boost reelection goals. the empirical analysis evaluates whether partisan bias is evident in the locations and impact of world bank agricultural aid to india. the authors analyze georeferenced data on aid projects, election results, and cropland coverage at the levels of state parliamentary electoral constituencies and administrative districts from 1995 to 2008. they find that alignment between local legislators and the political parties that govern state and national governments is associated with a greater number of new aid projects and with anomalous changes in cropland coverage. the evidence is consistent with arguments that partisan bias works primarily through patronage to achieve strategic party goals.
3. title: the microfoundations of latin america's social policy coalitions: the insider/outsider labor divide and attitudes toward different welfare programs in mexico
authors: baker, andy.
abstract: in latin america, formal workers (labor insiders) and informal workers (outsiders) tend to be enrolled in distinct welfare programs, so scholars generally assume that a fundamental political cleavage pits insiders against outsiders. according to a meta-analysis reported in this article, however, survey-based studies have hitherto shown the two groups to have relatively similar social policy preferences. the article seeks to reconcile these two strains by arguing that the insider/outsider binary oversimplifies the reality of latin american labor markets. workers' frequent movement between the two sectors as well as marriages between informal and formal workers endow many individuals with mixed policy interests. using an original and nationally representative poll of mexican adults, this article shows that an insider/outsider attitudinal cleavage does exist but is widest between informal and formal workers without mixed interests. the article also shows how new survey questions that improve on previous measures produce stronger relationships between labor traits and attitudes. the findings have implications for the study of social policy coalitions and insider/outsider politics in latin america and beyond.
4. title: property threats, antistatism, and business organization in latin america
authors: ondetti, gabriel.
abstract: business elites' ability to act collectively is influenced by the scope of their political organization. within latin america, large cross-national differences exist on this variable. some countries have strong encompassing associations that can speak authoritatively for the private sector as a whole, but others do not. this article examines the causes of these differences through a comparative historical analysis of brazil, chile, and mexico. the existing scholarship offers three explanations of variance in business organizational scope in the region, focusing on threats, state encouragement, and the mode of transition to neoliberalism, respectively. this article argues that the explanations involving state encouragement and neoliberal transition are unconvincing. although the focus on threat is more satisfying, the existing perspective on threat should be refined in two important ways. one is by emphasizing the centrality of threats to private property. threats of other types may induce temporary cooperation, but what distinguishes cases of strong and enduring encompassing organization is the occurrence of major property threats. the second refinement is to specify that ideas about the state provide the causal mechanism linking threat to organization. property threats engender encompassing organization by institutionalizing, within the business community, views that underscore the dangers of state economic intervention.
5. title: consent and legitimacy: a revised bellicose theory of state-building with evidence from around the world, 1500�2000
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abstract: this article builds on the large literature that discusses if frequent international wars enhance state-building, as famously argued by charles tilly. it integrates key insights of that literature and a series of additional arguments into a more comprehensive and systematic model of bargaining between rulers and ruled. the model specifies the conditions under which wars are likely to build states: if there are political institutions enabling such bargaining and expressing the consent of the ruled, if the population contributed substantially to the war efforts by providing soldiers and taxes, and if rulers are legitimized either through nationalism or success at war. the article expands the empirical horizon of existing quantitative research by assembling two measures of state development, ranging from the early modern period (for nearly 20 states) to the years from 1860 to the present (for 116 countries). findings from a variety of regression models empirically support the model.
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