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volume 112, issue 2, february 2022
1. title: can you move to opportunity? evidence from the great migration.
authors: derenoncourt, ellora.
abstract: this paper shows that racial composition shocks during the great migration (1940�1970) reduced the gains from growing up in the northern united states for black families and can explain 27 percent of the region's racial upward mobility gap today. i identify northern black share increases by interacting pre-1940 black migrants' location choices with predicted southern county out-migration. locational changes, not negative selection of families, explain lower upward mobility, with persistent segregation and increased crime and policing as plausible mechanisms. the case of the great migration provides a more nuanced view of moving to opportunity when destination reactions are taken into account.
2. title: imperfect markets versus imperfect regulation in us electricity generation.
authors: cicala, steve.
abstract: this paper evaluates changes in electricity generation costs caused by the introduction of market mechanisms to determine production in the united states. i use the staggered transition to markets from 1999 to 2012 to estimate the causal impact of liberalization using a differences-in-difference design on a comprehensive hourly panel of electricity demand, generators' costs, capacities, and output. i find that markets reduce production costs by 5 percent by reallocating production: gains from trade across service areas increase by 55 percent based on a 25 percent increase in traded electricity, and costs from using uneconomical units fall 16 percent.
3. title: political turnover, bureaucratic turnover, and the quality of public services.
authors: akhtari, mitra; moreira, diana; trucco, laura.
abstract: we study how political turnover in mayoral elections in brazil affects public service provision by local governments. exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. in education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05�0.08 standard deviations lower. in contrast, turnover of the mayor's party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. these findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process.
4. title: a satellite account for health in the united states.
authors: cutler, david m.; ghosh, kaushik; messer, kassandra l.; raghunathan, trivellore; rosen, allison b.; stewart, susan t.
abstract: this paper develops a satellite account for the us health sector and measures productivity growth in health care for the elderly population between 1999 and 2012. we measure the change in medical spending and health outcomes for a comprehensive set of 80 conditions. medical care has positive productivity growth over the time period, with aggregate productivity growth of 1.5 percent per year. however, there is significant heterogeneity in productivity growth. care for cardiovascular disease has had very high productivity growth. in contrast, care for people with musculoskeletal conditions has been costly but has not led to improved outcomes.
5. title: consumer information and the limits to competition.
authors: armstrong, mark; zhou, jidong.
abstract: this paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. within the class of signal structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures that are optimal for firms and those that are optimal for consumers. the firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. the consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less preferred product. our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly.
6. title: hospital network competition and adverse selection: evidence from the massachusetts health insurance exchange.
authors: shepard, mark.
abstract: health insurers increasingly compete on their networks of medical providers. using data from massachusetts's insurance exchange, i find substantial adverse selection against plans covering the most prestigious and expensive "star" hospitals. i highlight a theoretically distinct selection channel: consumers loyal to star hospitals incur high spending, conditional on their medical state, because they use these hospitals' expensive care. this implies heterogeneity in consumers' incremental costs of gaining access to star hospitals, posing a challenge for standard selection policies. along with selection on unobserved sickness, i find this creates strong incentives to exclude star hospitals, even with risk adjustment in place.
7. title: incomplete information bargaining with applications to mergers, investment, and vertical integration.
authors: loertscher, simon; marx, leslie m.
abstract: we provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. the market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. we show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient.
8. title: an equilibrium model of the international price system.
authors: mukhin, dmitry.
abstract: what explains the central role of the dollar in world trade? will the us currency retain its dominant status in the future? this paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework with endogenous currency choice that can address these questions. complementarities in price setting and input-output linkages across firms generate complementarities in currency choice making exporters coordinate on the same currency of invoicing. the dollar is more likely to play this role because of the large size of the us economy, a widespread peg to the dollar, and the history dependence in currency choice. calibrated using the world input-output tables and exchange rate moments, the model can successfully replicate the key empirical facts about the use of currencies at the global level, across countries, and over time. according to the counterfactual analysis, the peg to the dollar in other economies ensures that the us currency is unlikely to lose its global status because of the falling us share in the world economy, but can be replaced by the renminbi in case of a negative shock in the us economy. if the peg is abandoned, the world is likely to move to a new equilibrium with multiple regional currencies.
9. title: taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home.
authors: bierbrauer, felix; tsyvinski, aleh; werquin, nicolas.
abstract: we develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. we show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. we study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.
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