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volume 36, issue 3, july 2023
1. title: narratives of digital sovereignty in german political discourse.
authors: lambach, daniel; oppermann, kai.
abstract: digital sovereignty has become a prominent concept in european digital policy, and germany stands out as its leading advocate in europe. how digital sovereignty is being understood in german politics is therefore highly relevant for broader policy debates on the european level. this motivates the main objective of the article to map out the different meanings that are attributed to digital sovereignty in german political discourse. specifically, the article adopts a narrative framework to reconstruct the narratives through which these meanings are constructed. the analysis identifies seven different but overlapping narratives of digital sovereignty in the german discourse that serve to promote partly contradictory political agendas. we argue that this diversity is not a bug, but a feature. specifically, it supports rich internarrative linkages which benefit the broader resonance of each individual narrative. it also enables a broad set of political actors to enlist digital sovereignty for their specific priorities.
2. title: digital intermediaries, market competition, and citizen state interactions.
authors: agnihotri, anustubh.
abstract: can market competition between intermediaries improve the quality of citizen state interactions? i test this question in the context of a public private partnership (ppp) policy that created a network of digital intermediaries individuals authorized by the state to submit online applications on behalf of citizens. i use the overtime and staggered expansion of the intermediary network to identify the relationship between greater competition among digital intermediaries for the share of citizen applications and the quality of citizen state interactions. i find that having an increased presence of intermediaries in a jurisdiction does not improve the citizen experience in engaging with the state. why doesn't an increase in the presence of intermediaries positively impact the quality of citizen state interactions? i argue that digital intermediaries selected by the state have limited incentives to compete in the market for citizen applications. to establish the incentives of digital intermediaries, i juxtapose their functioning against informal intermediaries, who submitted paper based applications before the state moved citizen applications online. based on qualitative interviews and data on the transition from paper based to online applications, i show that the ppp policy by formalizing the citizen state interface disrupts informal mediation arrangement and limits market competition. the lack of relationship between the expansion of the intermediary network and the quality of citizen state interactions has important implications for how low and middle income countries deploy information technology for digitizing citizen interfacing governance processes. i conclude by outlining how formalization of citizen state interface can be implemented in a manner that can improve citizen experience engaging with the state.
3. title: rules or legacies? industry and political revolving doors in regulators' careers in portugal.
authors: coroado, susana; magalh�es, pedro c.
abstract: the movement of personnel between roles in regulation, politics, and regulated industries is thought to affect the risks of politicization and industry capture of independent regulatory agencies. to test whether such movements are better explained by formal rules or by sector specific patterns, we employ an original dataset of the 152 appointees to 11 iras in portugal over the last 3 decades. we find that variations in the formal independence of agencies have been of little consequence. instead, revolving doors abound in the financial sector, with a disproportionate share of regulators of that sector coming from, and moving back, to the industry. in turn, appointment of regulators with political links to portuguese iras seems related with legacies of sectoral public control.
4. title: serving quarreling masters: frontline workers and policy implementation under pressure.
authors: hinterleitner, markus; wittwer, stefan.
abstract: how do frontline workers implement policy when it is politically contested and they face strong pressure from politicians and the media? based on original data and a multi method analysis of juvenile justice policy and child protection policy in switzerland, we show that political conflict can change policy implementation when frontline workers adapt their implementation practices in response to political and media pressure. we demonstrate that frontline workers seek to limit the influence of political pressure on policy implementation to safeguard their professional autonomy and reputation. however, we observe that they may also occasionally engage in what we call "blame avoiding policy implementation." while formally complying with the policy mandate, frontline workers exploit their street level discretion to make policy implementation less scandal prone and blameworthy, thereby lowering the likelihood of blame attacks. the findings have important implications for our understanding of policy implementation and the functioning of bureaucracy in more conflictual times.
5. title: when blame avoidance backfires: responses to performance framing and outgroup scapegoating during the covid 19 pandemic.
authors: porumbescu, gregory; moynihan, donald; anastasopoulos, jason; olsen, asmus leth.
abstract: public officials use blame avoidance strategies when communicating performance information. while such strategies typically involve shifting blame to political opponents or other governments, we examine how they might direct blame to ethnic groups. we focus on the covid 19 pandemic, where the trump administration sought to shift blame by scapegoating (using the term "chinese virus") and mitigate blame by positively framing performance information on covid 19 testing. using a novel experimental design that leverages machine learning techniques, we find scapegoating outgroups backfired, leading to greater blame of political leadership for the poor administrative response, especially among conservatives. backlash was strongest for negatively framed performance data, demonstrating that performance framing shapes blame avoidance outcomes. we discuss how divisive blame avoidance strategies may alienate even supporters.
6. title: collaborative governance platforms and outcomes: an analysis of clean cities coalitions.
authors: lee, heewon.
abstract: collaborative efforts across sectors, scales, and government levels have been effective in addressing the goals to reduce petroleum use and mitigate environmental issues in the u.s. while community contexts shape local collaborative governance, diverse local interests do not necessarily translate into collaborations without proper facilitating efforts. this study expands the theoretical discussion on the concept of collaborative platforms, which is understudied despite their wide use as a governance instrument to catalyze local collaboration. specifically, the way platforms mediate to create local collaborations among diverse local level interests and improve outcomes has not been studied much to date. using data on the environmental protection agency's clean cities program to promote local collaborative governance related to alternative fuels, this paper examines the way collaborative platforms create, scale, and affect the outcome of supplying alternative fueling infrastructure. the results of multi level mixed effects models indicate that the collaborative platform integrates local interests to create and scale local collaboration, and achieves better outcomes leveraging local interests.
7. title: parsing the impact of e government on bureaucratic corruption.
authors: kalesnikaite, vaiva; neshkova, milena i.; ganapati, sukumar.
abstract: prior research has examined the effect of e government on corruption but has only considered perceived political corruption that differs from the actual corruption that citizens experience in their routine encounters with street level bureaucrats. this study focuses on petty corruption and delineates the underlying mechanism through which e government aids in curbing it. we argue that online service delivery reduces corruptibility on both sides bureaucrats and citizens by limiting the frequency of their interactions. to test this theoretical expectation, we vary the conditions under which petty corruption occurs. using data from latin america and the caribbean, a region riddled with corruption, we demonstrate that e government significantly reduces bureaucratic corruption, but only for services where direct contact between citizens and street level bureaucrats can be avoided.
8. title: designing democracy: how does institutional structure affect civic participation?
authors: abbott, jared; touchton, michael.
abstract: how does the structure of democratic institutions affect citizen engagement? this study employs conjoint analysis to assess the effects of institutional design on political participation in participatory budgeting (pb) programs. we find evidence that pb program design strongly affects citizens' interest in participation. participation appeals more to citizens when pb programs offer participants meaningful control over decision making outcomes, when barriers to participation are low, and when resources allocated through pb are targeted diffusely to communities rather than individual beneficiaries. we also find that focusing pb on issues specific to marginalized communities does not necessarily boost interest in participation among members of those communities. finally, we observe few systematic differences in preferences for participation between demographic groups traditionally associated with low rates of civic engagement compared to other groups. we then use the results surrounding pb to discuss broad implications for citizen participation in participatory institutions and democratic governance.
9. title: helping hand or centralizing tool? the politics of conditional grants in australia, canada, and the united states.
authors: schnabel, johanna; dardanelli, paolo.
abstract: conditional grant programs are widely used in federal systems to address the tension between decentralized policy provision and territorial equity, given constraints on constituent units' ability to raise revenues. while enhancing their financial capacity, conditional grants are often seen as reducing constituent units' policy autonomy. against this backdrop, this article examines the actual impact conditional grants have on the capacity and autonomy of a constituent unit. we analyze key milestones in the genesis and evolution of conditional grant programs in education and healthcare in australia, canada, and the united states. we find that the impact of conditional grants primarily depends on constituent units' size, fiscal capacity, and distinctiveness. conditional grants are most beneficial to smaller and/or fiscally weaker constituent units but highly distinctive units suffer the most significant autonomy losses. if they are not to exacerbate centralization, conditional grants programs thus need to be sensitive to the preferences of the more distinctive constituent units.
10. title: critical thoughts about critical mass in representative bureaucracy: a theoretical exploration and empirical illustration.
authors: meier, kenneth j.; xu, xiaoyang.
abstract: studies of representative bureaucracy frequently reference the need for a critical mass before an underrepresented group can influence policy outputs or outcomes, but the empirical literature is modest and presents mixed findings. this article presents a theoretical exploration to illustrate how critical mass can link individual behavior to organizational contexts. by examining both active representation and symbolic representation at both the individual and organizational level and specifying the different microprocesses of active representation, a series of testable hypotheses are presented. the logic suggests that the concept of critical mass might also be a useful contextual variable to examine other aspects of administrative behavior. based on the theory, two empirical illustrations from china are presented.
11. title: negotiating public service bargains in postrevolutionary times: the case of iran's diplomatic corps.
authors: beaud, guillaume.
abstract: new political regimes stemming from revolutions eventually find themselves confronted with the imperative to build upper bureaucratic apparatuses geared towards facilitating regime stability. this article examines the process of "re bureaucratization" in the islamic republic of iran, whereby institutions are designed and reworked over time to accommodate distinct features of the reshuffled bureaucratic elite initially incongruous in a deregulated revolutionary environment. precisely, it examines state institutions established to recruit and train postrevolutionary iranian diplomats following the purges of state bureaucracies. relying on qualitative and quantitative data, the article shows how such institutions allowed to outstrip loyalty driven politico administrative arrangements that are essentially
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12. title: organizational commitment in local government bureaucracies: the case of zambia.
authors: resnick, danielle; siame, gilbert.
abstract: what drives organizational commitment in local government? despite the growth of decentralization initiatives in many developing countries and concurrent investments by international donors to build public sector capacity, there thus far has been little consideration of what drives bureaucrats to stay committed to local government service. this paper addresses this question by drawing on original survey data with more than 150 bureaucrats across 16 district councils in zambia. the findings show that along with education, key factors that shape commitment include alignment with the mission of local government service, clear job objectives provided by supervisors, and placement in a city council. by contrast, extrinsic rewards and political interference play a more important role when examining drivers of job satisfaction. the results underscore the need for nuanced and multi modal policy interventions in developing country contexts to retain skilled staff in local government and improve the delivery of services to local communities.
13. title: varieties of connections, varieties of corruption: evidence from bureaucrats in five countries.
authors: harris, adam s.; meyer sahling, jan hinrik; mikkelsen, kim sass; schuster, christian; seim, brigitte; sigman, rachel.
abstract: why do some bureaucrats engage in corruption for personal gain, yet others for political gain? we show that these forms of corruption frequently do not coincide and offer an explanation: bureaucrats hired based on political and personal connections have different identities and incentives which compel them to engage in corruption for political and personal gain respectively. list experiments with a unique sample of 6400 bureaucrats in five countries in africa and asia support our argument. as theoretically expected, effects are strongest for bureaucrats whose political patrons remain in power (for corruption for political gain) and who do not need corruption gains to sustain their households (for corruption for personal gain). we also find that personal connections matter more than political connections for bureaucratic recruitment across surveyed countries. our findings underscore the importance of studying varieties of bureaucratic corruption and of supplementing the politicization literature with studies of personal connections in bureaucracy.
14. title: the changing faces of the modern state.
authors: lindvall, johannes; rogers, katren.
abstract: this paper describes the changing nature of the english and swedish states between 1800 and 2020 from the perspective of ordinary citizens. we identify 13 typical life situations and then describe the types of citizens who interacted with the state, the number and types of public officials with whom they interacted, and where those interactions took place. we distinguish among three typical social groups: the poor, the middle, and the rich. we find, among other things, that the poor became objects of government policy much earlier than other groups, but they also remained in a world of parochial poor relief even as the middle and the rich began to interact with a more functionally differentiated, professional bureaucracy. these findings have important implications for scholarly debates on when the state began to interact directly with the civilian masses and the unevenness of state activities and capacities within countries.
15. title: state formation in china and taiwan: bureaucracy, campaigns, and performance.
authors: carothers, christopher.
abstract: strauss persuasively demonstrates her thesis that our understanding of state-building is far from complete without knowledge about how state-building agendas are organized and implemented. moreover, the unusually successful state-building in sunan and taiwan may have had features systematically different from the less successful or at least slower state-building that has occurred in most of the developing world. in developing countries, the capacity of the state is a fundamental determinant of governance outcomes, economic and social development, and the consolidation of political regimes.
16. title: localized bargaining: the political economy of china's high speed railway program.
authors: wang, erik h.
abstract: often a pitfall of institutionalist scholarship is the need for more politics in the causal chain.[2] yet ma's work does an excellent job of bringing politics back in. finally, in articulating his contributions to the power-sharing literature, ma views the bureaucracy in a large, decentralized country like china as a distorter, or even a i decelerator i , of the ruler's agenda. in i localized bargaining, i xiao ma addresses an important yet understudied question in chinese politics and the political economy of development more generally: how does distributive politics take place in a non-electoral context?.
17. title: protecting the ballot: how first wave democracies ended electoral corruption.
authors: m. kuhn, patrick.
abstract: students and observers of electoral malfeasance in contemporary emerging democracies are often blissfully unaware that electoral corruption was as widespread in the democracies of 19th-century europe. resource-endowed politicians facing the highest economic and electoral costs associated with the continued use of an illicit campaign strategy are, therefore, the pivotal legislators enabling electoral reform. depending on the initial resource distribution and the extent of rising economic and electoral costs, a legislative majority supporting a specific electoral reform emerges if a group of resource-endowed politicians reconsiders the attractiveness of the status quo.
18. title: pawned states: state building in the era of international finance.
authors: goenaga, agust�n.
abstract: the wars that made states in early modern europe were also largely funded by sovereign debt, so why were war-incurred debts particularly damaging to state development during the nineteenth century? i pawned states: state building in the era of international finance i is one of the most important contributions to the literature on state capacity in the past decade.
19. title: spin dictators: the changing face of tyranny in the 21st century.
authors: hajnal, �ron.
abstract: on a hopeful note, they point out that the most important advantage that democracies have against dictators is the idea of liberal democracy itself - today's dictators do not have any solid competing ideas. dictators have been around since the beginning of human history. what makes spin dictators distinctively different from fear dictators?
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